

FACULTAD DE TEOLOGÍA "SAN VICENTE FERRER"

SERIES VALENTINA

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VALENCIA
2004

SUÁREZ ON ART PRODUCTION

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Konrad Fiedler, in his study on the origin of artistic production, questioned whether that which is expressed exists before and independently of the actual expression (“daß dasjenige, was dabei zum Ausdruck kommt, schon abgesehen von dem Ausdruck und vor demselben vorhanden sei”).¹ Many modern artists and theorists of art shared Fiedler’s doubt. “Kunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sondern macht sichtbar”, says Paul Klee.² “Das Sagen ist... nicht nur der Ausdruck sondern die Realisierung des Denkens” –says Walter Benjamin.³

Francisco Suárez, in his 25th *Disputatio metaphysica*, starts from the perfect cognition which, at any stage of the production process, is an ‘actual representation’ of the piece of art as it really is.⁴ This cognition, not a mental image or preconception, guides the artist’s operation and is therefore called *idea* or *exemplar*. Any ‘objective representation’ is accidental to the production process.⁵

My aim is to understand what the parallels between Suárez and Fiedler are and whether the opponents of Suárez would have rejected

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¹ K. FIEDLER, “Über den Ursprung der künstlerischen Tätigkeit” (1887), in: *Schriften zur Kunst*, vol. 1, München 1971, pp. 183-367, here: p. 192.

² P. KLEE, “Schöpferische Konfession” (1920), in: *Das bildnerische Denken (Form- und Gestaltungslehre*, vol. 1), ed. by Jürg Spiller, Basel/Stuttgart 1971 (1956), pp. 76-80, here: p. 76

³ W. BENJAMIN, “Gut schreiben,” in: *Illuminationen (Ausgewählte Schriften*, vol. 1), Frankfurt 1977, p. 313

⁴ Cf. note 36.

⁵ Cf. note 68.

Fiedler's doubt and taken for granted the preexistence of that which in art finds its expression.

1. THOMAS AQUINAS

Suárez develops his position by setting himself apart from Thomas Aquinas, or, as he claims, from the position which some consider to be Thomas'. Thomas develops his definition of the idea from a threefold distinction of forms. The idea or its Latin equivalent, the exemplar,⁶ is that form on which something is modelled (*ad quam aliquid formatur*)⁷, or, more precisely, the form to the imitation of which something is produced (*forma... ad cuius imitationem aliquid constituitur*).⁸ Thomas considers this definition to be in total accord with the traditional understanding of the idea as form which is imitated by something (*forma quam aliquid imitatur*).⁹ But to exclude similarities which arise by chance, like when a quick sketch turns out to resemble some thing or person, the imitation has to be *ex intentione agentis*, like when a painter produces a portrait with the intention of making it similar to the person who is his model.¹⁰ Thus, Thomas is led to the following description of the *ratio ideae*: "Haec ergo videtur esse ratio ideae, quod idea sit forma quam aliquid imitatur ex intentione agentis qui praedeterminat sibi finem."¹¹

Thomas has no preference as to the model being inside the artist's mind or outside of it. Contrarily, he explicitly states his indifference to this question.¹² This indifference, as Ockham explains, goes back to Seneca: "Nihil autem ad rem pertinet utrum foris habeat exemplar ad quod

⁶ Cf. SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, [prologus]; Opp. omn. 25, p. 899a. – Some authors, though, like Fonseca and Hurtado, do distinguish between *idea* and *exemplar*.

⁷ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 3: *De ideis*, a. 1; Opp. omn. (ed. Leon.) t. 22, Rom 1970, p. 99b, l. 178.

⁸ *Ibid.*, ll. 179-180.

⁹ *Ibid.*, ll. 180-182.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ll. 183-190: "Sed sciendum quod aliquid potest imitari aliquam formam dupliciter: uno modo ex intentione agentis, sicut pictura ad hoc fit a pictore ut imitetur aliquem cuius figura depingitur; aliquando vero talis praedicta imitatio per accidens praeter intentionem et a casu fit, sicut frequenter pictores a casu faciunt imaginem alicuius de quo non intendunt."

¹¹ *Ibid.*; p. 100a, l. 220-223.

¹² *Ibid.*; p. 100a, l. 217-220: "Dicimus enim formam artis in artifice esse exemplar vel ideam artificiatum, et similiter etiam formam quae est extra artificem ..."

referat oculus, an intus quod ipse concipit."¹³ Ockham quotes this passage literally and approves of it.¹⁴

2. FRANCISCUS SUÁREZ

The Suarezian reinterpretation of Thomas comprises the following elements:¹⁵

1. Thomas adheres to Seneca's *pictor* scheme according to which the *facies Vergilii* serves as the idea in the process of portraying Vergil.¹⁶ For Suárez, the outer exemplar is primarily cause of a concept of itself. It is *objectum motivum* of this concept.¹⁷ But that which regulates the artistic process is the conception of the thing as it is being produced.¹⁸

2. Consequently, the thing outside is not indispensable for artistic operation. What serves better is an act of thought by which the *res efficienda* is properly and immediately conceived. The thing outside is no exemplar in the strict sense – Suárez labels it *imperfectum exemplar* or even *adminiculum*.¹⁹

3. The thing outside recedes into the background, and with it the artist's intention to create something which is similar to that thing. The intention to imitate is just *denominatio extrinseca* to the actual outcome.²⁰

¹³ SENECA, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, epist. 65, § 7.

¹⁴ OCKHAM, *I Sent.*, d. 35, q. 5 D; Opera Theologica 4 (ed. G. Etzkorn und F. Kelly), St. Bonaventure NY 1979, p. 486 sq.

¹⁵ This enumeration is based on a list which Prof. Wolfgang Hübener gave in the papers to his seminar *Gibt es "êtres purement objectifs"?* – *Der Disput zwischen Desgabets und Kardinal Retz über den cartesischen Idee begriff*, winter term 1996/97, Freie Universität Berlin.

¹⁶ Cf. note 10.

¹⁷ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 2, n. 10; Opp. omn. 25, p. 913b: "Nam si loquamur de sensibili exemplari, illud primo ac per se movet ad sui notitiam, et in eo genere concurrat efficienter tanquam objectum motivum."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*; Opp. omn. 25, p. 913b/4a: "... proxime enim non regulatur artificium, nisi juxta conceptionem mentis; ..."

¹⁹ Suárez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 28; Opp. omn. 25, p. 907b: "... talis res non est per se necessaria ad operationem artis, quae fit per exemplar, nam melius fieret per propriam et immediatam cognitionem ipsiusmet rei arte efficiendae; illud ergo externum adminiculum (ut ita dicam) menti objectum, non est proprium et per se exemplar, sed est quasi materia remota, vel objectum adjuvans ad formandum aliquale seu imperfectum exemplar." – Cf. SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 2, n. 9; Opp. omn. 25, p. 913a.

²⁰ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 2, n. 10; Opp. omn. 25, p. 914a: "... quod artifex intendat assimilare effectum extrinseco objecto, solum est habitudo vel denominatio extrin-

The form produced by the artist may show some similarity to another, external form, but this is accidental to exemplar causality.²¹ Any kind of passive imitation rather belongs to final causality,²² and to hold that the intention to produce a simile is essential to the exemplar²³ is to confuse *exemplar* and *finis*.²⁴

4. After these many corrections, the classical definition has to be revised. To say that the artist looks out at the exemplar and works to imitate it, may be appropriate for *sensibilia exemplaria*. But these are being used only because of the artist's imperfection; they are *exemplaria* only *per accidens*.²⁵

5. Exemplar causality does therefore not consist in the external transfer of a form (*informatio extrinseca*).²⁶ There is not one form –be it outside or inside the artist's mind– being compared to and imitated by another one.²⁷ The artist may preconceive his work, but this only shows how not perfect he is and his conceptions are.²⁸

seca proveniens ab actu voluntatis ejus, et non addit effectui essentialem dependentiam ab alio objecto, quae ad genus causae formalis pertineat; ...”

²¹ Ibid.: “Artifex enim per se solum intendit talem formam inducere in suum effectum, ad quod per se solum indiget propria conceptione illius formae; quod vero haec forma assimiletur alteri extrinsecae, per accidens est ad causalitatem artis ut sic; ergo et ad causalitatem exemplaris.”

²² SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 2, n. 3; Opp. omn. 25, p. 911b/912a: “... nam haec passiva imitatio fini proprie convenit, quando in eo nihil aliud intenditur, nisi ejus repraesentatio.” – Cf. note 54.

²³ Thomas had supplemented the traditional formula, *forma ad quam aliquid formatur*, by a reference to the artist's intention: *ex intentione agentis*. For this reason Suárez, whenever he rejects the need for such an intention, aims at a core element of Thomas' theory. Cf. note 10.

²⁴ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 2, n. 2; Opp. omn. 25, p. 911a-b: “De causa vero finali posset aliquis dubitare; nam munus exemplaris esse dicitur, ut ad illius similitudinem vel imitationem effectus fiat; sed haec est habitudo finis; ergo concursus exemplaris non est, nisi concursus quidam finalis. ... In quo discursu plane videtur exemplar cum fine confundere.”

²⁵ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 41; Opp. omn. 25, p. 910 a: “illa vero locutio, quod artifex respiciens ad exemplar, operatur ad illius imitationem, non oportet ut cum omni proprietate sumatur. Ortus enim videtur ille loquendi modus ex sensibilibus exemplaribus, quibus homines ob imperfectionem suam uti solent, et ad illa respicere ut ad objecta proxima quae imitentur. Verumtamen jam dixi hujusmodi /910b/ exemplaria esse quasi per accidens”

²⁶ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 2, n. 9; Opp. omn. 25, p. 913b: “... ergo non consistit haec causalitas in illa veluti informatione extrinseca, quae est quasi per comparationem et imitationem unius formae ad aliam.”

²⁷ Ibid.: “Rursus neque etiam interius est per se necessarium aliquod objectum distinctum ab effectu artefaciendo; ...”

²⁸ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 18; Opp. omn. 25, p. 905a: “... ille modus praereconipiendi non est per se in artifice ut sic, sed in artifice imperfecto, aut imperfecte cognoscente.”

6. Thus, Suárez is led to the conviction that the *sententia communis*, identifying exemplar and objective concept (*conceptus objectivus* – CO), cannot be true. The exemplar is not objectively in the intellect, but subjectively as an inhering act. It is the formal concept (CF), or, most precisely:

conceptus ipse formalis practicus rei efficiendae²⁹

illud quo artifex sibi repraesentat rem quam effecturus est, ...ut illius repraesentationem expleat³⁰

illud quod ipsum operans in suomet intellectu format³¹

The absence of any kind of preconception is the most significant trait of Suárez' *ratio formalis ideae*. In fact, his theory of cognition does not give room for such a preconception, for it rejects any kind of intramental term, or result, of the act of cognition which would be different from the act itself.³²

On the one hand, he rejects the Scotist theory according to which the thing which is conceived generally receives a special mode of being called *esse obiectivum*.³³

Unde colligitur differentia inter conceptum formalem et obiectivum, quod formalis semper est vera ac positiva res et in creaturis qualitas menti inhaerens, obiectivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; concipimus enim interdum privationes, et alia, quae vo-

²⁹ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 27; Opp. omn. 25, p. 907a.

³⁰ Suárez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 41; Opp. omn. 25, p. 910b. – Cf. note 54.

³¹ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 43; Opp. omn. 25, p. 910b.

³² For a materially and intellectually very rich discussion of scholastic theories of cognition, and of the importance of the CO/CF-distinction to these theories, cf. J. Schmutz, “La migration des concepts. La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif au croisement des scolastiques parisiennes et espagnoles,” in: *Philosophie et théologie à Paris au XVIe siècle*, Actes du colloque de Paris (CNRS/Université de Paris-X), 8-10 novembre 2001, sous la direction d'Emmanuel Faye et Zénon Kaluza, Paris, Vrin, forthcoming.

³³ Cf. Th. KOBUSCH, *Sein und Sprache*, Leiden 1987, p. 207: “Dem objektiven Begriff mag wie den entia rationis ein esse obiectivum zukommen, aber dieses objektive Sein [...] ist im Sinne einer äußeren Benennung zu verstehen und stellt keinen eigenen Seinsmodus neben dem Wirklichsein dar.”

cantur entia rationis, quia solum habent esse objective in intellectu.³⁴

Objective being only occurs when a being of reason is produced – when something which has no entity in itself is conceived as if it was a being.³⁵ That the objective concept is not distinguished from the thing itself is one of the core assertions of Suárez' treatment of the ideas:

... conceptus objectivus, si sit omnino proprius et adaequatus rei faciendae, non distinguitur ab ipsamet re; ...

Based on this premise, he immediately rules out the possibility of the exemplar being the CO:

... idem autem non est mensura suiipsius.³⁶

On the other hand, Suárez rejects the Thomist doctrine of a *verbum mentis* which would serve as *medium in quo* and which would therefore be distinct from the act of cognition:

... multi censent, verbum mentis esse qualitatem distinctam ab actu cognoscendi, deservientem cognitioni, ut objectum proximum, in quo res repraesentata cognoscitur; ... illa sententia de verbo mentis falsa est ...³⁷

For Suárez, the distinction between *verbum mentis* and *actio intellectus* is just a *distinctio modalis* – the *verbum* is not a result of the cognition, but it is the cognition.³⁸ As there is a parallel between *verbum* and

³⁴ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 2, s. 1 n. 1; Opp. omn. 25, p. 65a.

³⁵ Cf. SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 54, s. 1, n. 6; Opp. omn. 26, Paris 1866, p. 1016b: "Et ideo recte definiri solet, ens rationis, esse illud, quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu, seu esse id, quod a ratione cogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habet." – Cf. *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 54, s. 2, n. 15; Opp. omn. 26, 1022a: "... ens rationis proprie fieri per illum actum intellectus, quo per modum entis concipitur id, quod in re non habet entitatem."

³⁶ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 29; Opp. omn. 25, p. 907b.

³⁷ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 37; Opp. omn. 25, p. 909a/b: "multi censent, verbum mentis esse qualitatem distinctam ab actu cognoscendi, deservientem cognitioni, ut objectum proximum, in quo res repraesentata cognoscitur; ... illa sententia de verbo mentis falsa est".

³⁸ Cf. W. HÜBENER, Art. "Konzept," *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 4, Basel 1976, col. 1085: "Durch Abschwächung der thomistischen Unterscheidung des *verbum mentis* von der *actio intellectus* zu einer *distinctio modalis* gelangt es Suárez, den Terminus des Aktes in diesen

exemplar ("quod in speculabilibus est verbum, creditur esse exemplar in operabilibus"³⁹), it immediately follows that also the exemplar is the act of cognition.

The uniqueness of the Suarezian theory of ideas will become the more apparent when we compare it to those of his Jesuit confreres like Hurtado, Arriaga, and Oviedo. These three may be considered Nominalists, based on their identification of *actus intelligendi* and *verbum*.⁴⁰ But at least Arriaga and Oviedo ascribe a certain kind of intramental existence to the piece of art before it is produced, and even Hurtado claims that a cognition of the *opus faciendum* has to precede the practical act.⁴¹

I intend to further elucidate the Suarezian theory of ideas by juxtaposing it to some contrary approaches.

3. BARTOLOMEO MASTRI DA MELDOLA – BONAVENTURA BELLUTO

Mastri (1602-1673) and Belluto (1600-1676), two Scotists for whom the idea is the objective concept ("res cognita per intellectum"⁴²), deal with Suárez' opinion extensively.⁴³ Their main point of criticism is derived from the definition of the idea as "id, cui agens, dum operatur, intendit assimilare suum opus".⁴⁴ But that to which the artist intends to assimilate his work is not the cognition, but the thing conceived.⁴⁵ It is not the

zurückzunehmen («verbum conceptus obiectivus mentis non est, sed formalis» [Anm. 41: F. Suarez, Opera omnia 3 (1856) 633 b])."

³⁹ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 37; Opp. omn. 25, p. 909b.

⁴⁰ Cf. JACOB SCHMUTZ, "La migration des concepts," *loc. cit.* (paging to be determined): "... les doctrines du verbe mental et de l'intentio thomiste dans la scolastique espagnole ultérieure, en particulier dans sa composante jésuite ... proposent ce qui peut nous paraître aujourd'hui comme une lecture 'nominalisante' de Thomas d'Aquin, en identifiant généralement sans autre forme de procès verbe mental et concept formel."

⁴¹ Cf. note 71 (Arriaga), note 73 (Oviedo), and note 63 (Hurtado).

⁴² MASTRI – BELLUTO, *In Phys.*, d. 7 *De causis extrinsecis, efficienti et finali*, q. 7 *De causa ideali seu exemplari*, [prologus]; *Philosophiæ ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, Venetiis 1678, t. 2, p. 242a (archetypal edition Venetiis 1646).

⁴³ MARCO FORLIVESI ("La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri," *Les Études philosophiques* 2002, pp. 3-30), when dealing with Mastri – Belluto, found the passage on ideas to be very useful for understanding the distinction between CO and CF.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 145; p. 242 b.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*: "... sed agens intendit assimilare effectum non suae cognitioni[s], sed rei cognitae".

cognition, because in order for the artist to achieve this assimilation, two conditions have to be met:

(a) The idea has to be comparable (and in some way similar) to its effect. But the act of thought does not have any windows, no certain height etc., as the house outside is supposed to have.⁴⁶

(b) The idea has to be known. But for the cognition to be known a direct act would not be enough. Another, reflexive act of thought would be necessary. But it is the experience of the artist not to have such a reflexive act. Therefore, the cognition cannot be the idea.⁴⁷

Mastri – Belluto suggest that Suárez might reply as follows:

ad (a): The act of thought and its effect are similar to each other not *realiter*, but *intentionaliter*.

ad (b): For the cognition to be known no formal reflexion is required – it does not have to be known as *quod*. A *cognitio reflexa virtualis* by which the cognition is known as *quo* does fully suffice, and in this sense, any cognition is reflexive on itself.⁴⁸

Mastri – Belluto do not consider these arguments a challenge to their rejection of the Suarezian position:

⁴⁶ Ibid.; p. 243a: "Tum quia artifex comparat in agendo suum effectum cum idea, quia ab ipsa regulatur, et dirigitur in actione, et utitur idea ad commensurandam, et definiendam formam, quam intendit effectui praeberere, et nequit hoc facere, nisi comparando effectum cum idea, sed non comparat cum conceptu formali, sed cum obiectivo, quia artifex comparando, sic dicit, domus, quam facere volebam, non erat tam ampla, erat quadrata, habebat tot fenestras, tot cubicula, etc., sed esse quadratum, amplum, habere fenestras, cubicula, etc. non convenit conceptui formali, sed obiectivo, ergo, etc."

⁴⁷ Ibid.; p. 242b-243a: "Tum quia idea est, ad quod aspiciens agens operatur, quod non solum externo exemplari convenit, ut ait Amicus, sed etiam interno, quia istud quoque est directivum, et regulativum actionis agentis, concurrat ad effectum, quatenus ad ipsius similitudinem, et imitationem fit, ergo debet cognosci, aliter si nullo modo cognosci deberet, posset etiam in brutis, et inanimatis poni ratio ideae; sed agens in agendo, non cognitionem suam, /243a/ sed rem conceptam aspicit, ergo res concepta, non cognitio, erit idea, haec minor probatur, quia cognitio cognoscitur cognitione reflexa, non directa, sed quilibet artifex experitur, non habere talem reflexam cognitionem, immo si nec posset habere, dummodo perfecte cognoscat rem faciendam, perfecte operabitur."

⁴⁸ Ibid., n. 146; p. 243a: "Resp. Suar. cognitionem esse similem effectui, non realiter, sed intentionaliter, et cognosci, seu aspici ab artifice, non cognitione reflexa formali semper, sed aliquando, semper autem cognitione reflexa virtuali, quia quaelibet cognitio est aliquo modo cognoscitiva sui ipsius, et supra seipsam quasi reflexiva, hinc in Deo intellectio divina, quae est conceptus formalis, non alio actu distincto cognoscitur, sed seipsa; et hoc sufficit ad rationem ideae."

ad (ad (a)): The intentional similarity of the act consists of nothing else than the (actual) representation of the effect. But the agent does not intend to imitate the representation, but the represented house. He compares the effect to the represented thing.⁴⁹

ad (ad (b)): The act of comparison (*actus collativus*) has to have "duo obiecta cognita ut Quae": the house inside and the house outside the mind. By a virtual reflection, the cognition becomes known as *Quod*, not as *Quo*. Therefore, the cognition is not the idea. It is but *conditio sine qua non* of the idea's causality.⁵⁰

Suárez does not share the two Scotists' premise of the artist intending to assimilate his work to the exemplar (element #4). In order to distinguish *causa exemplaris* and *causa finalis*, he rejects any kind of passive imitation (element #3). After having ruled out the outer exemplar (elements #1 and #2), that which is imitated would have to be some intramental objective representation which Suárez does not admit.

Nevertheless, Suárez holds on to the traditional view that, the better the idea is known, the more perfect the piece of art.⁵¹ As the exemplar is an act of thought, it is made known only by reflection. Still, there is no formal, but just a virtual reflexion required. It does suffice that the act knows about its tendency towards a certain object and thus becomes known *ut quo*:

Tunc ergo non est necesse ut exemplar cognoscatur tanquam obiectum quod, sed satis est ut implicite et per modum tendentiae ad obiectum aliquo modo cognoscatur, ea tantum implicita et virtuali

⁴⁹ Ibid.: "... similitudo illa intentionalis nil aliud est, quam repraesentatio effectus, sed agens non intendit assimilare effectum suae repraesentationi, sed domui repraesentatae, ut probatum est, comparat enim effectum cum re cognita, et agit iuxta omnia in ipsa re praeconcepta, unde a re praeconcepta regulatur in ratione exemplaris."

⁵⁰ Ibid.: "Nec cognitio illa virtualiter reflexiva aliquid valet ad rationem ideae quia idea debet esse explicite cognita ut Quod, non ut Quo nam effectus illi comparatur, comparatio autem, cum sit quidam actus collativus, debet habere duo obiecta cognita ut Quae; sed solum sufficit, ut obiectum cognoscatur, non cognitio, ergo reflexio supra cognitionem parum facit ad rationem ideae; unde licet in Deo talis reflexio reperitur, non tamen inservit ad rationem ideae. Hinc nisi idea sit cognita, non poterit exercere suam causalitatem, et actu dirigere agens, sed cognitio ista, cum sit solum actualis repraesentatio ideae, se habet tantum ut conditio sine qua non; sicut finis, licet causet solum per suam entitatem, et bonitatem, tamen nisi cognoscatur, et intendatur, non potest causare, quae cognitio est conditio sine qua non; ut dicemus q. seq."

⁵¹ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 31; Opp. omn. 25, p. 908a: "... ut [exemplar] causet, oportet ut aliquo modo cognoscatur, et quo perfectius fuerit cognitum, eo, caeteris paribus, perfectius causabit."

reflexione, quam quilibet actus mentis in se includit, ratione cuius dicitur cognosci seipso ut quo, quamvis non cognoscatur ut quod.⁵²

The traditional vocabulary has undergone a change of meaning. There is a similarity between act and object, but it is a “similarity according to the intellectual representation which the formal concept has with regard to the thing it expresses.” This kind of representational character of the relation between act and object – there is no objective representation, but a formal, actual, intellectual one – does not allow for any difference in completeness:

Ad secundum (sc. s. 1, n. 8, §. *Secundo*) respondetur, illam locutionem, exemplar esse, ad cuius similitudinem fit effectus, et quod artifex imitatur operando, facile verificari de ipso conceptu formali, quia non sunt illae locutiones intelligendae de similitudine formali, quae naturalis est, seu entitativa, sed de similitudine secundum repraesentationem intellectualem, quam habet conceptus formalis, circa rem quam exprimit, et hanc imitationem vel conformitatem intendit artifex in sua operatione;...⁵³

The lack of difference, the conformity between representation and object is all the artist can intend, and he immediately intends it by intending the (representational) act. In a sense, the artist – through the exemplar – represents the thing to be produced (*rem quam effecturus est*) to himself in order to imitate the exemplar, but one should rather say that he does it in order to ‘explete’ or complete the representation:

... per se enim exemplar internum sufficit et requiritur ad actionem, et illius imitatio immediate intenditur; et ideo sufficienter posset explicari ratio exemplaris, dicendo, esse illud quo artifex sibi repraesentat rem quam effecturus est, ut illud imitetur, seu potius, ut illius repraesentationem expleat.⁵⁴

All of the important concepts are reinterpreted by Suárez:

⁵² SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 39; Opp. omn. 25, p. 910a.

⁵³ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 41; Opp. omn. 25, p. 910a.

⁵⁴ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 41; Opp. omn. 25, p. 910b.

<i>Traditional Scotist position (Mastri – Belluto)</i>	<i>Suárez</i>
passiva imitatio (s. 2, n. 3)	imitatio [quae] immediate intenditur (s. 1, n. 41)
repraesentatio objectiva (s. 1, n. 37)	repraesentatio formalis/actualis/intellectualis (s. 1, n. 37)
similitudo formalis, quae naturalis est, seu entitativa (s. 1, n. 41)	similitudo secundum repraesentationem intellectualem (s. 1, n. 41)
cognitum ut quod (s. 1, n. 39)	cognitum ut quo (s. 1, n. 39)

4. JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA (JOÃO/JOHN POINSOT)

Joannes a Sancto Thoma (1589-1644) considers the intellectual act (*intellectio*) to be really distinct from its intramental result for which he uses the term ‘*verbum*’ in his theory of cognition but the term ‘*conceptus formalis*’ in his treatise on art production. Still, the two expressions remain synonymous: “conceptus, verbum, species expressa, seu terminus intellectionis (quae omnia idem sunt).”⁵⁵ By this, of course, it is ruled out that the *intellectio* is a kind of concept.

But there is further differentiation required to get to something with which the exemplar could be identified. With respect to the intellect, the CF is *forma informans*, because it is intrinsic to that which is formed; it is inherent to the intellect. With respect to the object which is about to be produced, it is *forma formans*, “quia non est in ipso formato sed extra.”⁵⁶ The *exemplar* is CF in this latter sense.

Joannes a Sancto Thoma gives several explanations of the twofold character of the formal concept:

⁵⁵ JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Logica*, p. 2, q. 12 *De divisionibus signi*, a. 2 *Utrum conceptus sit signum formale; Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*, Paris 1883, t. 1, p. 613a.

⁵⁶ JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Philosophia naturalis*, p. 1, q. 9 *De causa materiali, formali, et exemplari*, a. 3 *Ad quod genus causae reducat idea seu exemplar?; Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*, Paris 1883, t. 2, p. 213a.

CF ut forma informans ≠exemplar	CF ut forma formans = exemplar
CF, ut praecise est id, quo intellectus redditur cognoscens, et secundum habitudinem ad intellectum, quem informat (p. 214a)	CF secundum habitudinem rei repraesentatae ad rem extra quam format (p. 214a)
CF per habitudinem ad intellectum, quem informat; sic enim est id <i>quo</i> intelligit, non id <i>quod</i> imitatur (p. 214b)	objectum ipsum, prout beneficio conceptus intra ipsum redditur immateriale, et denudatum a conditionibus materiae, et ut habet habitudinem imitabilitatis ad id, quod in materia est (p. 214b)
CF secundum se, et in ordine ad intellectum, ut ad subjectum (p. 215a)	ipsum objectum intrinsece cognitum, hoc est in conceptum redditum immateriale et intelligibile per modum expressionis (p. 215b)
Forma, quam artifex intelligit (p. 215a)	id quod <artifex> imitandum proponit (p. 215a)
qualitas afficiens intellectum (p. 215a)	aliquid intellectum quod tanquam imitandum accipitur (p. 215a-b)
id <i>quo</i> cognoscitur illud, quod imitandum est (p. 215b)	res cognita, quam attendit artifex ut imitandam (p. 215b)
CF sub habitudine formae informantis, quam intellectus intelligit (p. 215b)	CF sub habitudine objecti expressi in conceptu, et formantis aliud extra conceptum (p. 215b)
... conceptus <formalis> habet duplex officium seu formalitatem, <u>alteram</u> respectu intellectus, et sic reddit ipsum cognoscentem, tanquam terminus cognitionis, ... (p. 216a)	... <u>alteram</u> respectu objecti, et sic reddit illud immaterializatum, et intellectum in actu. (p. 216a)
entitas conceptus ... non est cognitum ut <i>quod</i> , nisi reflexe (p. 217a)	objectum, ut constitutum in esse objecti illuminati, et intellecti ut <i>quod</i> (p. 217a)

What may be confusing here is that the concept with respect to the intellect is sometimes explained as that by which is thought (*id, quo intelligitur*) and sometimes as that which is thought (*forma, quam intellectus*

intelligit; terminus cognitionis). But this does not affect the distinction between the two aspects of the formal concept. The formal concept with respect to the intellect may well be *terminus productus* of the *intellectio*, but it is never *terminus cognitus, seu objectum*.⁵⁷ The formal concept with respect to the object is in a sense identical with the object (it is the *objectum redditum immateriale et intelligibile*) and can therefore well be *terminus cognitus*. Probably, the expression '*terminus cognitus*' applies to nothing else but to the formal concept with respect to the object, because with the identification of *conceptus, verbum, and terminus*, the outer object does hardly qualify.

The distinction *terminus (ut) productus / cognitus* is developed by Joannes a Sancto Thoma in order to explain the modal distinction between *intelligere* and *dicere*:

intellectio de se non dicit habitudinem productivi, nec respicit terminum ut productum, sed ut cognitum, dicere autem respicit terminum ut dictum, seu ut productum.⁵⁸

The Suarezian arguments against the Thomists' understanding of the exemplar apply to this elaboration, too. – (1) The intramental quality which is supposed to be the *exemplar* is not apt to represent the outer object objectively, because it has no formal similarity to the outer object. – (2) The intramental quality which is supposed to be the *exemplar* would have to be known in order to make the external object known.⁵⁹ (But it is not known, as this would require a reflexive act.) – These arguments, like those against the Scotist solution, focus on the doubling of the object into an intramental and an extramental one. For Suárez, the object itself is the immediate term of the intellectual act, and the *verbum* as its intramental term is only modally distinct from the act.⁶⁰ The act represents the thing

⁵⁷ Cf. JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Philosophia naturalis*, p. 3, q. 11 *De intellectione, et conceptu*, a. 1 *Utrum intellectio sit de praedicamento actionis, vel qualitatis, distinguaturque realiter a verbo mentis?*; *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*, Paris 1883, t. 3, p. 490b.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; p. 495 a.

⁵⁹ SUAREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 1, n. 37; *Opp. omn.* 25, p. 909b: "neque ille modus repraesentationis objectivae per formalem similitudinem intelligi potest in illa qualitate (sc. in verbo), quae nec formalem, nec realem convenientiam habet cum externo objecto, nec etiam intelligi potest quomodo in illa directe cognoscatur externum objectum, illa nullo modo cognita."

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*: "suppono conceptum formalem immediate terminari ad rem ipsam quam repraesentat". – For the modal distinction between *actus* and *verbum*, cf. note 38.

by referring the intellect to the object ("referendo intellectui objectum ipsum").⁶¹

5. HURTADO, ARRIAGA, OVIEDO

According to Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), there are four things involved in art production: (1) *objectum externum cognitum ab operante, ad cuius similitudinem producit effectum = exemplar*; (2) *cognitio talis objecti = causa exemplaris = idea*; (3) *actus dirigens potentiam ad opus*; (4) *effectus productus per talem actum*.⁶² So idea and exemplar are not the same. The exemplar is always external, whereas the idea is the act by which the thing to be produced is conceived. The role of the exemplar is minimal – neither the exemplar nor the *idea exemplaris* are directive to the artist's operation. When painting, the artist needs to have an idea of the line he is about to draw, and this line's placing or colour cannot be found in the images externally proposed to him. "[E]rgo actus immediate dirigens manu non est Idea exemplaris, sed Idea operis faciendi."⁶³

The human artist's idea is vague, "quia eius nullam habet propriam speciem, sed confusam."⁶⁴ Only God has a proper and clear idea of the singular things he is about to produce.⁶⁵ God's idea may even be called exemplar, "quia e divinis manibus tale opus evadit, quale propria repraesentatur Idea."⁶⁶

There is an important difference between Hurtado and Suárez. For Hurtado, the *causa exemplaris* is no cause in the strict sense.⁶⁷ For Suá-

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² PEDRO HURTADO DE MENDOZA, *De Anima*, d. 11 *De actu practico et speculativo*, s. 5 *De causalitate actus practici in obiectum*, n. 26; *Disputationes de universa philosophia*, Lyon 1617, p. 870

⁶³ Ibid., n. 28; p. 870.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., n. 29; p. 870 sq.: "Respondeo, Deum operari /871/ per Ideam propriam, et claram obiecti singularis faciendi, ad quod non dirigitur per cognitionem alterius exemplaris."

⁶⁶ Ibid.; p. 871.

⁶⁷ Id., *Physica*, d. 8 *De causis in communi*, s. 1 *Causam definitio*, n. 9; *Disputationes de universa philosophia*, Lyon 1617, p. 318: "Ex dictis collige, causam exemplarem, et finalem non esse rigore causas, quia nullum habent influxum in effectum (ut patebit disp. 11 & 14 de anima) neque per se influunt, sed per alias potentias."

rez, the exemplar exerts true efficient causality. This requires that the artist's exemplar is of the singular thing which he is about to produce. Suárez does not turn humans into gods, but he considers any distinctness between (preconceived) object and effect, any vagueness in representation to be accidental to the production process, "quia artifex non intendit effectum, nisi quatenus est omnino idem, et in eo quod est diversum non procedit ex causalitate exemplari."⁶⁸ Furthermore, this distinctness is not even always there. Angels, for example, do not conceive confusedly. Foremost Christ, *in quantum homo*, had he wanted to produce a piece of art, would have had a distinct cognition of the individual object in its particular current state.⁶⁹

Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592-1667) avoids the term '*conceptus*' when discussing the *causa exemplaris*. He rejects the Suarezian identification of cognition and exemplar and adopts Molina's definition: "respectu artificis creati exemplar esse obiectum per cognitionem repraesentatum."⁷⁰ It is not impossible, Arriaga states, that the exemplar, existing intentionally in the intellect, produces itself in its physical existence.⁷¹

Francisco de Oviedo (1602-1651) is no less a proponent of preconception than Arriaga: "propissime operatur artifex exemplari ductus, quando exercet idem opus, quod praecognovit."⁷² But he starts from the

⁶⁸ SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 25, s. 2, n. 9; Opp. omn. 25, p. 913b. – Cf. note 27.

⁶⁹ Ibid.: "Angeli enim etiam possunt facere res artificiales, et non oportet ut eas confuse concipiant, sed distincte, et easdem numero quas affingunt. Et Christus Dominus in quantum homo, si aliquid artefactum operari voluisset, ad nullum aliud obiectum respiceret nisi ad ipsummet in individuo distincte cognitum, quod esset facturus."

⁷⁰ RODRIGO DE ARRIAGA, *Physica*, Disp. 8 *De causa materiali, formali, finali, et exemplari*, s. 8 *De causa exemplari*, n. 91; *Cursus philosophicus*, Antwerpen 1632, p. 359b. – Cf. *ibid.*, s. 5 *De causa finali*, subs. 2 *De ratione formali causativa finis*, n. 51; p. 353 b: "ergo quod amat voluntas, quod illam delectat, quod eam allicit ut quod, non est cognitio finis, sed finis ipse, qui est obiectum cognitionis, sive finis ille sit quid reale, sive quid fictum, apprehensum tamen ut bonum: nam sicut intellectus potest cognoscere ea quae non sunt, ita et voluntas ea potest amare, et ab illis allici intentionaliter media cognitione, non tamquam re amata aut alliciente, sed tamquam conditione quasi applicante illud obiectum voluntati."

⁷¹ Ibid., n. 92; p. 360a: "non esse impossibile, finem intentionaliter existentem in voluntate esse causam finalem, seu producere seipsum quoad existentiam physicam, quod idem dico de exemplari." – Ibid.: "recte autem potest quis in productione physica alicuius rei inspicere ad ipsam rem cognitam in esse possibili, imo ita quotidie contingit, cum artifex prius mente concepit opus aliquod artificiosum, quod postea vult de facto producere eo modo quo illud apprehendit."

⁷² FRANCISCO DE OVIEDO S.J., *Physica*, Controversia 11 *De causa finali et exemplari*, Punct. 3 *De causa exemplari*, n. 8; *Cursus philosophicus*, Lugduni 1640, t. 1, p. 326a.

external object, which *per denominationem extrinsecam* becomes intrinsic (!) to the intellect and is therefore called *exemplar internum*.⁷³ After thus having been internalized, the external object does not even have to exist physically: “obiectum externum dum non existit existimo posse terminare cognitionem, et esse exemplar, neque aliud ego cognosco exemplar internum a cognitione distinctum.”⁷⁴

To the question “an ratio exemplaris consistat in conceptu obiectivo, an in formali?”, Oviedo answers: That which is imitated is the objective concept.⁷⁵ But the operation by which the piece of art is finally produced is so guided that it physically attains the term which the cognition attains intentionally. One might therefore say that the cognition – “non secundum entitatem, sed secundum repraesentationem” – is imitated by the operation.⁷⁶ The formal concept, the cognition, may therefore be called *exemplar internum formalis*.

The identification of formal concept and exemplar might suggest some closeness to Suárez. But Suárez has clearly qualified ‘being imitated’ as accidental to exemplarity, whereas Oviedo uses precisely this ‘being imitated’ to let some exemplarity flow from the objective to the formal concept.

CONCLUSION

For the modern schoolmen whom we have analyzed, the exemplar is only intramental and not at all outside the mind. In the theories of

⁷³ Ibid; p. 325a: “obiectum per denominationem illi extrinsecam dicitur intellectui intrinsecum, seu exemplar internum intellectus”. – In a sense, the external object in itself may be called *exemplar externum*: “Quapropter divisionem illam exemplaris obiectivi in internum, et externum explicio de eodem exemplari externo non extrinsece denominato cognitione, sine qua influere nequit, quod externum dicitur eidem obiecto externo cognitione denominato, ratione cuius internum dicitur, non quia secundum se internum sit, sed quia per cognitionem denominatur existens in intellectu.” (ibid.).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid., n. 6; p. 325b: “Id, quod agens intendit imitari, est conceptus obiectivus.”

⁷⁶ Ibid., n. 7; p. 325b: “Cognitio, seu conceptus formalis potest aliquo modo dici exemplar, quatenus artifex illam imitatur, non secundum entitatem, sed secundum repraesentationem: ex eo enim, quod artifex sua operatione attingat idem obiectum, quod intelligit intellectu sua cognitione, et operatio artificis, intellectusque cognitio eundem respiciant obiectum, seu terminum, potest dici operatio imitari cognitionem, ex vi cuius regitur, ut attingat eundem terminum physice, quem intentionaliter attingit cognitio, quod est conformari operationem cum cognitione.”

Thomas and Ockham, with their equivalence of inner and outer exemplar, “scheinen die entwerfenden Künste stillschweigend auf der einen, die mimetischen dagegen auf der anderen angesiedelt worden zu sein.”⁷⁷ This means that the modern inner exemplar, if the mimetic character of the mimetic arts is to be preserved, must serve as a bridge between model and piece of art.

The second result is that the opponents of Suárez plead for an inner exemplar which is an objective representation of the work which the artist is going to produce, or of some other thing outside. With an inner exemplar of the latter kind, the imitation is obvious. But also the proponents of a preconception in the strict sense – i. e. the inner exemplar of the first kind – do not call into question the mimetic character of painting, or sculpting.

Suárez gives up the traditional understanding of the exemplar as something which has to be imitated, or which contains something which has to be imitated. That which is expressed does not precede the expression – this is how he would answer Fiedler’s question. That something can be perceived in the way the piece of art suggests is the result of the production, not its prerequisite. Snow being violet is nothing the impressionists saw and then painted – it is a visibility which emerges simultaneously with their pictures. Therefore, so he argues, the similarity between piece of art and anything which may traditionally be called ‘model’ is accidental to the causality of art.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ W. HÜBENER, “Idea extra artificem”, in: *Festschrift für Otto von Simson*, ed. by L. Grisebach, K. Renger, Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, Wien 1977, p. 34.

⁷⁸ Cf. notes 21 and 22.